Introduction

Must the federal government regulate carbon dioxide? The EPA final rule titled “Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act” reverses the legal obligation to regulate greenhouse gas emissions– a major blow to climate regulation.[1] The rescission overturns the Obama era “Endangerment Finding”, which enables carbon dioxide to be regulated under the Clean Air Act.[2] The EPA boasts this as “one of the largest deregulatory acts in U.S history.”[3] Indeed, the Clean Air Act’s reach is crucial to federal climate protections. Its adoption in 1970 was a watershed moment of “statutory and institutional transformation” for environmentalism in the U.S.[4] Today, environmental rules and regulation are built upon the foundation established by the Clean Air Act. For example, national ambient air quality standards provide a fundamental regulatory mechanism.[5] As a cornerstone of environmental protection, interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s meaning and scope has significant implications for the future of climate policy.

In this article, I argue that EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s legal rationale for the rescission is self-defeating. Zeldin does not provide sound reasoning showing how U.S. law supports a departure from Massachusetts v. EPA, the case permitting greenhouse regulation. Zeldin’s usage of Loper-Bright v. Raimondo is self-defeating because Loper’s core principle of nondelegation cuts against the very legal interpretation Zeldin asserts.

This paper will proceed as follows: In Section II, I outline the legal history culminating in the rescission of the Endangerment Finding, in Section III, I describe the Massachusetts precedent that Zeldin sets out to overturn. In Section IV, I delve into the legal rationale of the Rescission Rule, emphasizing two fundamental issues, and in Section V, I suggest that the issues identified indicate a significant contradiction in Trump-era legal reasoning.

I. Background

The legal dispute centers on section §202(a)(1) of the CAA which states that the EPA Administrator will create and revise, “…standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from … new motor vehicles … which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”[6] EPA Administrators have vacillated, in step with political affiliation, on whether carbon dioxide emissions and resulting climate change are under the jurisdiction of the CAA according to the text of §202(a)(1).[7] The consequences of this debate are profound; interpretation of §202(a)(1) determines if carbon dioxide is legally a pollutant, and in turn, if the Clean Air Act obligates the U.S. government to address climate change.[8]

Interpretive disagreement stretches back to 1999, when a group of lawyers calling themselves the “Carbon Dioxide Warriors” petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency to begin regulating motor vehicle emissions of CO2 under §202(a)(1).[9] President George W. Bush’s EPA denied the petition in 2003, arguing that the CAA does not apply to the issue of global climate change, and thus, that the CAA does not authorize regulation to address global climate change.[10] The dispute culminated in the 2007 Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency in which the Court struck down the Bush denial, ordering the EPA to “properly engage” with the statutory text to make an endangerment finding.[11] Bush’s reasons for refusal were roundly rejected as the Court set the bounds of future greenhouse decisions to be grounded in the text of the CAA rather than policy concerns.[12]

In response to Massachusetts, the Obama Administration’s EPA published the 2009 endangerment finding titled “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act”.[13] This rule found “…elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health and to endanger the public welfare” and that “…greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles contribute to the air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.”[14] As such, the Endangerment Finding established the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gasses from motor vehicles in accordance with Massachusetts.[15] Then, in February 2026, the EPA under Trump published Rescission wherein Zeldin argued that the EPA does not have the statutory authority to regulate Greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles under the CAA afterall, undoing the U.S government’s legal obligation to address climate change.[16]

Federal carbon dioxide regulation largely rests upon the CAA, a law with no express purpose of dealing with Climate.[17] The back and forth conflict in the Executive and Judiciary over interpretation of §202(a)(1) reveals how –in the absence of fresh legislation– interpreting aging laws like the CAA privileges the jurisprudence of a handful of Supreme Court Justices and EPA lawyers with enormous influence in casting the fate of climate protection.

Legal Timeline (Figure One)

Year	Event
1999	Petition to regulate Greenhouse gases under Clean Air Act introduced.
2003	Bush EPA denies petition
2007	Massachusetts v. EPA. Supreme Court rejects EPA legal rationale for denying petition, ordering the EPA to ground decision on the statutory text.
2009	Obama Endangerment Finding published establishing the EPA’s legal authority to regulate greenhouse gasses from motor vehicles.
2024	Loper-Bright v. Raimondo reforms congressional delegation. Courts must no longer defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation.
2026	Rescission Ruling. Trump EPA revokes its legal authority to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gasses under the CAA.

II. Understanding Massachusetts

Richard Lazarus, a professor of environmental law at Harvard Law School, characterized Massachusetts v. EPA as “the most important environmental law case ever decided by the Court.”[18] The Court examines the legal rationale provided in the 2003 EPA decision to deny the 1999 petition.[19] In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Stevens reviews the Bush EPA rationale for rejecting the petition, where the bulk of the argument focused on statutory language regarding whether carbon dioxide “contributes” to global climate change. The Bush EPA reasons that the CAA only meant to give the EPA authority to regulate local or regional exposure to pollution, not the indirect effects of greenhouse gasses as they warm the planet.[20]

Justice Stevens dismisses this logic in a clear ruling: “The Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes ‘any’ air pollution … The statute is unambiguous.”[21] Thus Massachusetts forecloses Bush interpretive argument of §202(a)(1).

Stevens also provides guidance on the legal implications of a future endangerment finding: “On … whether §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a judgment that such emissions contribute to climate change. We have little trouble concluding that it does”.[22] Massachusetts is an emphatic reversal of EPAs initial rejection, delivering a clear victory to the Carbon Dioxide Warriors in the interpretive battle over §202(a)(1).

In the subsequent sections, I investigate Zeldin’s legal rationale in the Rescission Rule. Since the Court evaluates and dismisses the Bush interpretation in Massachusetts, Zeldin calls upon a landmark ruling that radically reformed how agencies must read and enforce statutes, Loper Bright v. Raimondo Enterprises (2023), to differentiate his case from Bush. I argue that the Loper Doctrine does not aid Zeldin’s case but in fact prohibits the administrative action he takes in the Rescission Rule.

III. The Rescission Rule

The fundamental claim of the Rescission Rule is that “…the EPA lacks statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide under §202(a)(1)”. This claim is familiar as it was litigated in Massachusetts.[23] Zeldin says Loper “provide[s] new guidance on how Federal agencies should interpret the statutory provisions” giving him license to take a fresh look at the reach of §202(a)(1) and ultimately conclude that the Endangerment Finding (EF) contains statutory interpretation exceeding the authority delegated by the Clean Air Act.[24] But Zeldin’s project of statutory interpretation finds no support in the Loper Doctrine. Since Loper is the primary element in Zeldin’s argument setting it apart from Bush, his case lacks legal reasoning sufficient to escape Massachusetts.

A. Overcoming Massachusetts

Massachusetts deems that the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate emissions from motor vehicles “in the event that it forms a judgment that such emissions contribute to climate change.” Massachusetts requires a finding on the impact of human activity on earth’s atmosphere, not an argument on law or policy. The distinction between legal interpretation and scientific incredulity is important. If Zeldin seeks to undo the legal obligations formed by EF, it appears that he must show that emissions do not contribute to climate change.[25]

Unlike Obama’s Endangerment Finding, the Rescission rule forms no such empirical judgment demanded by Massachusetts.[26] Zeldin explains that the EPA is, “…not basing [The Rescission Rule] on a new finding under CAA section §202(a)(1)”(emphasis added).[27] Zeldin admits that, among his arguments, only those regarding statutory interpretation, not scientific findings provide legal basis for the Rescission Rule. He maintains only the statutory-authority aspect of his argument as an active legal argument, reserving the other as a dormant “harbor[ed]” concern.[28] Zeldin’s attack on the EF blends legal reasoning with climate science grievances. In fact, there are abundant portions of the Rescission Rule text questioning the effects of climate change and the futility of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, but by his own admission, these portions are legally dormant.[29]

This admission is of crucial importance to the legal strength of Zeldin’s case. If Zeldin does not formally contest the scientific finding in the EF, only arguing over statutory interpretation, it is mysterious how the Rescission Rule challenges the legal precedent in Massachusetts. Is the EPA simply, as Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes claimed, “reviving an argument the Supreme Court has already rejected”?[30] To clear this hurdle, Zeldin employs new methodology, utilizing the Loper Bright v. Raimondo doctrine to argue that Massachusetts no longer applies.

B. Loper-Bright

In 2024, Loper-Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo overturned Chevron v. NRDC (1984), discarding the Chevron Doctrine, a requirement that courts defer to agency interpretation in most cases. Under Loper, interpretive authority previously commanded by the executive branch is now yielded to the judicial. Loper-Bright knocks-down the Chevron assertion that “judges are not experts in the field”, rebutting, “That depends … on what the ‘field’ is. If it is legal interpretation, that has been, ‘emphatically,’ ‘the province and duty of the judicial department’ for at least 221 years”.[31] Loper decreased the discretion agency policymakers could exercise when administering statutes by recasting agencies administration of law as an exercise of legal interpretation rather than technical or policy expertise.[32] If Loper does in fact reign in agencies this way, then the Rescission Rule’s novel legal interpretation – especially given that it is asserted over the court’s reasoning in Massachusetts – seems to violate the Loper doctrine.

In the recession, Zeldin makes explicit how he intends to leverage Loper saying, “…the Endangerment Finding and the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts straddled a transitional period regarding the standards for statutory interpretation and understanding agency authority. The breadth of agency discretion…[was] sharply disputed”.[33] By locating Massachusetts in a jurisprudential “transition”, Zeldin argues that the judiciary’s reformed protocols of statutory interpretation since Massachusetts effectively suspend Justice Stevens’ reading of §202(a)(1).

Taking advantage of Loper, Zeldin argues that the EF contains statutory interpretation that violates Congress’s intended meaning of §202(a)(1), saying that the issue of climate change is too structurally different from the pollution that legislators had in mind when writing the Clean Air Act. Greenhouse gasses operate differently than local pollutants like arsenic or lead, for example. Zeldin says that connecting climate change with its negative impacts on human health invokes “…causal relationships that are too uncertain, conjectural, remote, and convoluted by intervening and confounding factors to fit within the terms ‘‘cause,’’ ‘‘contribute,’’ and ‘‘reasonably be anticipated to endanger’’ as used in CAA section §202(a)(1).”[34] It follows that CAA’s text cannot treat carbon dioxide as a pollutant, saying it poses too great a leap. Zeldin concludes that the EF is more than just a scientific determination that carbon dioxide is a pollutant and problem to human health but an overreaching agency interpretation, an undemocratic act of agency action out of line with Congressional will, hence violating the boundaries set by Loper Bright.[35]

However, there are several issues with Zeldin’s analysis. The first is that it is odd to characterize the Endangerment Finding as a work of statutory interpretation. The EF is focused on the impact of elevated greenhouse gasses – a scientific question – rather than the scope of the CAA. For example, the Endangerment Finding states that, “changes in air quality, increases in temperatures, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens…provides strong and clear support for an endangerment finding.”[36] While the EF is not void of language referencing legal interpretation, this is strictly to demonstrate adherence to the Massachusetts decision, rather than to “assert authority” or “break new ground” as Zeldin accuses.[37] The EF even cites Massachusetts’ own language, reiterating, ‘‘…judged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, … to global warming.’’[38] The Obama EPA voices the Court’s conclusion in Massachusetts that the criteria which trigger legal obligation to regulate greenhouse gasses are met not by generating a novel statutory interpretation of its own but merely reporting scientific evidence.

If the EF is primarily reporting science, why does Zeldin present it as a legal argument? Massachusetts provides one valid legal mechanism for discovering the obligations of §202(a)(1): scientifically determined endangerment.[39] Before the Rescission Rule, the Trump administration eyed this path. Leading climate skeptics authored a report for Trump’s Department of Energy concluding that the Endangerment Finding’s analysis failed to account for the “positive impacts” of climate change, and that there are “significant uncertainties in predicted warming rates and their effects.”[40] But this groundwork for a legal effort striking science rather than law was expeditiously scrapped. Andrew Dessler, a climate scientist at Texas A&M University and author of a rebuttal to the DOE report says, “They would have been obliterated in court. [The DOE report] is the gold standard of climate skepticism and if this is the best they can do, then they’ve proven how robust climate science actually is.”[41] The EPA may have realized that targeting the science reported in the EF was a legal dead end. The EPA now pursues a strategy of upheaving the statutory interpretation decided in Massachusetts rather than the climate science it requires.

Loper restricts agency deference, but that doesn’t necessarily translate to reduced legal obligation for EPA. In fact, the Loper Bright doctrine works in opposition to the very legal effort Zeldin mounts in the Recession Rule. The Rescission Rule claims to “effectuate the best reading of the Clean Air Act” which acts to override the Massachusetts decision with the support of “judicial decisions [that] have significantly clarified” law regarding “the breadth of agency discretion.”[42] In The Rescission Rule, Zeldin seeks to override the judiciary’s interpretation of CAA with a reading of its own– his own deference. This contradicts what Loper Bright says: “Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority”(emphasis added).[43] According to Massachusetts, the Clean Air Act “unambiguously” authorizes greenhouse standards.[44] The courts have spoken here, dispensing the very legal interpretation which, as Zeldin quotes from Loper, is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department”.[45] This suggests that Loper Bright cuts against Zeldin’s exercises of agency deference.

Environmentalists have worried that Loper poses a radical threat to environmental law because it is part of a strain of jurisprudence – beginning with the Major Questions Doctrine in 2022 – targeting the administrative state, a part of government fundamentally connected to the strength of environmental regulation. Sanne Knudsen notes the field relies on “comprehensive and broad” congressional delegations that gives agencies the reins to interpret and administer the law with flexibility and discretion as issues like climate change emerge and evolve.[46] Due to the relationship between agency discretion and environmental law, Knudsen’s view that Loper presents a “deregulatory impulse” that will prey on environmental regulation follows.[47] I claim that the Rescission Rule’s contradiction with the reasoning in Loper flips Knudsen’s hypothesis by showing how Loper’s bias against the role of agencies in statutory interpretation can conversely serve environmental law. In the §202(a)(1) controversy, Loper’s insistence that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities” certainly buffers against Zeldin’s exercise of agency discretion in statutory interpretation as a means to dismantle environmental protection.[48] Invoking Loper as a justification to alter agency policy by asserting legal interpretation requires the very legal interpretation that Loper commands to be the exclusive province of the judicial.[49] As such, EPA usage of Loper to assert new interpretation is stuck in a bind, contradicting administrative action with the legal theory it depends upon.

Environmental regulation has been aided in the past by similar judicial logic. In the 1978 case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, a near-complete dam was brought to suit for violating the Endangered Species Act’s clause that the government “ensure that the actions authorized, funded, or carried out … do not jeopardize the continued existence of such species”.[50] Lawyers argued over whether these words should be applied to stop a project already so close to completion at the massive cost to the taxpayer for the sake of the Snail Darter fish. In the majority opinion ordering the dam be halted, Chief Justice Burger wrote, “It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated”.[51] This parallels Massachusetts ruling to ground EPA action in the text of the CAA. Tennessee is similar to Loper in its form of non-delagatory legal philosophy. Instead of deferring to the discretion of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Chief Justice Warren employed his judicial expertise to interpret the meaning of the ESA. Warren assumes interpretive sovereignty over agencies, deferring only when “it can be shown that the legislature actually intended the opposite result”.[52] Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill exemplifies how environmental law is not necessarily weakened by a tightening of agency discretion but can be fortified by rigid non-delegation. Understood in this light, Loper counters any administration hostile toward existing environmental regulation by restraining agency power.

Lastly, Loper is not a premise for agencies to nullify past decisions. Roberts stipulates, “…we do not call into question prior cases…The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful … [and] subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.”[53]

Conclusion

On the very first day of his second term in office, Trump released an executive order titled, “Unleashing Energy Dominance”. In section 2(d), he ordered that it is the policy of the United States to “ensure that all regulatory requirements related to energy are grounded in clearly applicable law.”[54] In this article I have shown one clear way that the Rescission Rule fails to meet the requirements of that policy. The Rescission Rule does not coherently ground itself in law. Its methods clash with the justification for limited valid agency practice handed down in Loper while ironically appealing to Loper.

A parallel trend of the divergence from the law is the targeting of the scientific facts inconvenient to Trump’s policy goals. The Federal Judicial Center removed the climate science chapter from the Fourth Edition Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, a guide judges rely on to ground opinions in solid fact.[55] Massachusetts’ strongest guard is how its insistence of the CAA’s textual unambiguity centers the role of scientific evidence in future litigation. The repeal of the climate science chapter from the Judicial Reference Manual matches Zeldin’s prior attempt to destabilize this legal landscape by siloing climate science away from jurisprudential debate. As much as any legal debate, environmental regulation is threatened by the effort to erode knowledge of scientific problems that environmental law exists to address.

If the Court, in future litigation, upholds the Rescission Rule, it will only deepen jurisprudential incoherence. During the Biden era, the Supreme Court greatly clamped down on executive power and agency discredtion. Now, they must uphold their legal reasoning of non-delegation, particularly toward agency statutory construction contradicting judicial precedent, which they argued against forcefully in 2024.[56] Loper Bright’s non-delegatory doctrine now acts to legally counter Trump’s habit of disregarding the law with far-reaching executive justification for controversial actions.

The Rescission Rule presents this jurisprudence with intense political pressure. The question of whether to ensure executive power is restrained by the legislature’s statutory ‘instructions’ professed during Biden’s term, or to empower a unitary executive to command law, professed during Trump’s second term, has brought Trump-Era legal philosophy to an impasse. By attempting to dismantle environmental protection while occupying both sides of this jurisprudential reasoning, the Court adopts an incohesive framework.

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[1]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, (2026).

[2]Id.

[3]OAR US EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA (May 11, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/climate-change/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a.

[4]Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (2nd ed. (2023).

[5]See Clean Air Act of 1963, CAA (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.).

[6]Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§7401-7671q.

[7]See Richard J. Lazarus, The Rule of Five: Making Climate History at the Supreme Court (2020).

[8]See Carrie Jenks, Sara Dewey, The Legal Reasoning Behind the Endangerment Rescission, Harvard Climate Brief, The Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability at Harvard University (Feb. 17, 2026), https://salatainstitute.harvard.edu/the-legal-reasoning-behind-the-endangerment-rescission/.

[9]Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 7.

[10]See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, §68.173 (2003) at 52925.

[11]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497, 534 (2007).

[12]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497, 534 (2007).; See also, Carrie Jenks, Sara Dewey, supra note 8.

[13]OAR US EPA, supra note 3.

[14]Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 66516, 66538 § 74.239 (2009).

[15]Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 7.

[16]See Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1.; see also, Carrie Jenks, Sara Dewey, supra note 12.

[17]OAR US EPA, Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA (May 29, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act.

[18]Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 7.

[19]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497 (2007).

[20]Jeffrey R. Holmstead, Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, (2003).

[21]Id. at 529.

[22]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497 (2007).

[23]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act §91.32 (2026).

[24]Id.

[25]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497 (2007).

[26]See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, (2009).

[27]Id. at 7688.

[28]Id. at 7696.

[29]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 3 at 7714.

[30]Attorney General Mayes Condemns the Illegal Rescission of EPA’s Landmark 2009 Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding, Arizona Attorney General’s Office (Feb. 12, 2026), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/attorney-general-mayes-condemns-illegal-rescission-epas-landmark-2009-greenhouse-gas.

[31]Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

[32]See Loper Bright’s Impact: Evidence from Interviews with Agency Rule Drafters, Yale J. Reg., https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/loper-brights-impact-evidence-from-interviews-with-agency-rule-drafters/ (last visited June 14, 2026).

[33]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1 at 7711.

[34]Id. at 7714.

[35]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1.

[36]Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 66497 (2009).

[37]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1 at 7688.

[38]Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, supra note 36.

[39]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497 (2007).

[40]Carrie Jenks, Sara Dewey, supra note 8.

[41]Scott Waldman, Trump Sidelines Climate Contrarians in Science Rollback, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.politico.com/news/2026/02/13/trump-sidelines-climate-contrarians-science-rollback-00779098.

[42]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1 at 7686, 7711.

[43]Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

[44]Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S 497 (2007).

[45]Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 1.

[46]Sanne H. Knudsen, Predicating (and Protecting) the Future of Environmental Law After Loper Bright, 85 Ohio State Law J., 1062 (2024).

[47]Id.

[48]Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) at 7711.

[49]Id. at 56.

[50]Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

[51]Id. at 53, 54.

[52]Id.

[53]Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

[54]Executive Orders, Unleashing American Energy, The White House (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/.

[55]See Abrahm Lustgarten, Under GOP Pressure, Federal Agency Pulls Climate Change Chapter From Official Manual for U.S. Judges, ProPublica (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judicial-center-climate-change-republican-pressure.

[56]Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).